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CHAPTER 7

Making Biomedical Policy
through Constitutional
Adjudication: The Example
of Physician-Assisted Suicide
Carl E. Schneider

Introduction
Throughout most of American history no one would have supposed biomedical policy could or should be made through constitutional adjudication. No
one would have thought that the Constitution spoke to biomedical issues,
that those issues were questions of federal policy, or that judges were competent to handle them. Today, however, the resurgence of substantive due
process has swollen the scope of the Fourteenth Amendment, the distinction between federal and state spheres is tattered, and few statutes escape
judicial vetting. Furthermore, Abraham Lincoln's wish that the Constitution
should "become the political religion of the nation" has been granted. "We
now reverently refer to the Supreme Court as the great arbiter of American
moral life, as performing a 'prophetic function,' as expressing what 'we stand
for as a people. "' 1 Its Justices are invoked as "moral teachers who help to
shape the character of our nation." 2 How could our most perplexing ethical
issues not be confided to such an institution?
My first purpose in this chapter is to consider that question, to ask
whether constitutional adjudication is a good way to make biomedical policy.
My answer-in its briefest, bluntest form-is no. I believe biomedical policy
is generally better made-is better informed, better structured, more responsive, wiser, and more legitimate-when it is made by the whole range
of governmental agencies Oegislatures, administrative agencies, referenda,
courts interpreting statutes and the common law), and semiofficial and
nonofficial institutions and individuals (commissions like the New York Task
Force on Life and the Law, professional associations like the American Association of Bioethicists and the American Medical Association, voluntary associations like churches, and individuals like scholars, doctors, patients, and
families). These actors and agencies will not produce perfect law; they may
not even produce good law. But they are likelier to do better than courts acting as interpreters of the Constitution.
My vehicle for this argument is the cases deciding whether there is a
constitutional right to assistance in committing suicide, particularly the
164
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Ninth Circuit's decision in Compassion in Dying v Washington 3 and the
Supreme Court's reversal of that decision in Washington v Glucksberg. 4 My
principal exhibit will be Compassion in Dying. It is the high-water mark of
the constitutional claim and the culmination of exceptionally thorough judicial consideration: The District Court found Washington's prohibition of assisted suicide unconstitutional; the Ninth Circuit's three-judge panel reversed; and the Ninth Circuit en bane reversed the panel by a vote of eight
to three in a long and detailed opinion. Compassion in Dying, in short, probably represents as considered a job as a court is likely to achieve in setting
biomedical policy through constitutional adjudication. It therefore repays
careful inspection.
An obvious objection to the argument against making biomedical policy
through constitutional adjudication is that, for better or worse, the Constitution creates rights courts must enforce, that courts thus cannot escape making biomedical policy, and that it is thus not worth asking whether constitutional adjudication will yield sound biomedical policies. I have several
answers to this objection. First, I rather quaintly doubt the Fourteenth
Amendment creates a constitutional right of privacy of the kind the Court
has created. This is a well-worn controversy, and I need only say here that
the reasons for my doubts are conventional ones, including the interpretive
leap such a right requires, the difficulties the Supreme Court has had articulating and defining that right, and the power the right gives unelected
courts. Perhaps somewhat less conventionally, I also believe the problems
with constitutional adjudication I will describe are relevant to whether a privacy right should be read into the Constitution.
Second, my arguments should be relevant even to someone who finds a
privacy right in the Fourteenth Amendment because they speak to some unresolved issues in the law of substantive due process. For example, even if
there is a privacy right, the capacity of courts to handle biomedical questions
well should affect our view of the right's scope: The privacy right is a judicial
creation; it should be one judges can interpret and implement effectively
and intelligently. Furthermore, my arguments speak to a persistent but neglected problem in Fourteenth Amendment analysis-how governmental interests should be evaluated. 5
Third, I will ask not just whether corstitutional adjudication is a good
way of making public policy, but also whether, under current constitutional
doctrine, statutes that make it a crime to help someone commit suicide are
unconstitutional. I will primarily contend that the state's interests are strong
enough to make those statutes constitutional even if there is some kind of
privacy right to assisted suicide.
In sum, this chapter serves this volume's goals in several ways. First, it
asks an important question about any issue of public policy-which institutions are best eptrusted with the decision? More particularly, it joins the
controversy over the role of courts as an instrument of public policy. 6 Second, it contributes to the debate on the scope of the right of privacy and on
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how state interests should be treated in Fourteenth Amendment analysis.
Third, it comments on the constitutional strength of the state's interests in
making it criminal to assist in a suicide. Finally, it speaks to the question
whether assisted suicide should be forbidden as a matter of public policy.
Since this chapter is lengthy, let me summarize its argument here. I will
not contend that constitutional adjudication must inevitably reach the
wrong result in bioethical cases. The Supreme Court in Glucksberg reached
the right one, even though the Court was divided and several of its members-perhaps a majority-warned that somewhat different facts might have
led them to a critically different result. I will argue, rather, that constitutional adjudication is ill-equipped to make good bioethical policy. This is particularly a problem where a court finds that a statute is unconstitutional, for
then the court substitutes its judgment for the legislature's and ordinarily attempts to sketch a new policy.
I will argue that there is little reason to prefer a court's judgment and
much reason to doubt its ability to craft sound policy. More particularly, I will
suggest that the Constitution and constitutional jurisprudence are poor in
guidance for making bioethical policy and that judges' training and experience hardly remedy this defect. Worse, litigation commonly fails to furnish
judges the information they need for evaluating statutes intelligently. To illustrate this point, I will scrutinize the Ninth Circuit's treatment of the interests the state asserted in Compassion in Dying. I will then propose that
these judicial handicaps are exacerbated by much in the culture of American law. I will conclude by arguing that other institutions are better placed
to make-and indeed are already making-policy governing assisted suicide
than are courts.

How Well Equipped Are Judges to Make Policy?

Judges interpreting the Constitution might make good policy for two reasons-because the Constitution states good principles for public policy and
provides a good framework for analyzing social issues or because judges'
training, experience, and procedures give them insight into what policy
should be. Neither of these conditions fits matters of biomedical policy.
First, the absence of any textual commission from the Constitution
means the Justices are thrown back on their own resources in making policy.
In privacy law, those resources have produced a perfectly worthy desideratum-autonomy. Yet by itself autonomy is no guide to policy. Autonomy, yes.
But in what quantities, in what places, and at what costs? 7 The Justices have
found no satisfactory way to turn a banality into a workable principle: Autonomy is notoriously a greedy concept, but the Court cannot define its limits.
Autonomy is notoriously one good among many, but the Court cannot articulate a sound method for accommodating it to other goods.
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Consider the announced principles of Fourteenth Amendment analysis.
First, a court decides whether a statute infrtnges a fundamental right. If it
does, it is constitutional only ifit is "necessary" to serve a "compelling" state
interest. If the statute does not infringe a compelling state interest, it is constitutional if it simply serves a "legitimate" state interest. Much depends,
then, on how one decides what rights are fundamental. However, even after
several decades of modern substantive due process, that decision remains
embarrassingly manipulable. For example, the Court ritually says it begins
"by examining our Nation's history, legal traditions, and practices." 8 But
everything turns on the specificity of that examination: Define the right narrowly and it will rarely look "fundamental." Justice Scalia was correct in his
concurrence in Cruzan v Director, Missouri Department of Health when he
denied that suicide had ever been thought a right9 and in his opinion for the
plurality in Michael H. v Gerald D. 10 when he said Americans had never
imagined a right to adultery. But the Court has not always employed Justice
Scalia's narrow definition of history and tradition. Had it done so in Roe v
Wade, for example, it could hardly have derived a fundamental right to abortion.11 Yet if one broadens one's definition of the right and asks whether
there is a history and tradition of protecting autonomy or of a "right to be left
alone," virtually any claim may be alchemized into a fundamental right.
This dilemma might lead us into despondency about the history-andtraditions test and toward a more conventional lawyer's approach-inferring
principles from precedent and then using the principle to guide decisions.
The most celebrated such attempt-one seized on by the Ninth Circuit in
Compassion in Dying-is from Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v Casey:
These matters, involving the most intimate and personal choices a person may make in a lifetime, choices central to personal dignity and autonomy, are central to the liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. At the heart of liberty is the right to define one's own concept of
existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human
life. Beliefs about these matters could not define the attributes of personhood were they formed under compulsion of the State. 12
Perhaps this rhapsody is inspiring; it is hardly instructive. The Court in
Glucksberg responded to it sensibly: "That many of the rights and liberties
protected by the Due Process Clause sound in personal autonomy does not
warrant the sweeping conclusion that any and all important, intimate, and
personal decisions are so protected, ... and Casey did not suggest otherwise." 13 But then what principle should be inferred from the cases? The
Court does not try to say. And how could it? What consistent principle
should be inferred from cases that hold, for instance, that private sexual activities may be criminalized 14 but that most abortions may not be?
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Like the formulations for evaluating fundamental rights, the tests for assessing the state's interests are mightily manipulable. A statute that interferes with a "fundamental right" must be "necessary" to promote a "compelling" state interest. What do those Delphic terms mean? The Court never
says. "Compelling" languishes in mystery, since the Court rarely uses it to
decide cases. "Necessary" has meant first that there is no less offensive way
of reaching the statute's goal and second that the statute is neither undernor overinclusive. Since no statute fully meets either criterion, few statutes
that infringe a fundamental right have 'scaped whipping. 15
As privacy jurisprudence developed, it became clear that the decision
whether a fundamental right had been infringed was virtually dispositive.
This seemed an embarrassing betrayal of the test the Court had promulgated, and it promoted an impoverished analysis. Gradually, the Court devised an intermediate category of scrutiny less apt to predetermine a
statute's fate. This answered some of the criticisms of the old two-tier system, but it has left privacy law even more befogged than before. The Court
only intensified these perplexities in Cruzan, for there the Court seemed to
abandon the language of fundamental rights to adopt the language of "liberty
interests." The Court then "balanced" the liberty interest against "the relevant state interests." 16 Justices Brennan and Stevens agreed Cruzan had a
fundamental right but not on how to evaluate the state interest. Justice
Brennan said that "if a requirement imposed by a State 'significantly interferes with the exercise of a fundamental right, it cannot be upheld unless it
is supported by sufficiently important state interests and is closely tailored to
effectuate only those interests."' 17 Justice Stevens said that, at a minimum,
the statute must "bear a reasonable relationship to a legitimate state end. " 18
Is this chaos of thought and passion, all confused, merely the product of
an early stage in privacy jurisprudence? Perhaps, but there are reasons to
think the pattern of undefined terms, multiple tests, and manipulable standards will persist. The problems with which the Court is struggling are bitterly difficult. Autonomy is a core value, but it is so endlessly expansive and
has such different costs and benefits in different situations that writing principles to promote it seems to baffle everyone. Furthermore, building doctrine
by committee is awkward, particularly where the committee membership
changes and the members are fractious and apparently unburdened by any
sense of obligation to compromise even enough to provide guidance to lower
courts, the bar, and the public. In both Cruzan and Glucksberg, for example,
Justice O'Connor was part of a five-person majority but wrote concurring
opinions that cast doubt on the majority's reasoning. And in Glucksberg the
nine Justices wrote six opinions. Furthermore, the Court constructs constitutional doctrine through a common law process that looks at issues piecemeal. This makes it hard for the Court to assess any doctrine as a whole.
As we will see throughout this chapter, this brief summary hardly does
justice to the problems the Court has encountered in stating a defensible autonomy principle and operationalizing it with workable tests. Thus, so much
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is left to the Justices' discretion that they must draw deeply on their own resources. So how well suited to making sound public policy are those resources?
Little in the training or experience of most judges fits them to make biomedical policy. Law schools primarily teach students to analyze legal documents and doctrines, to derive principles from precedents, and to apply
precedents to new cases. Despite decades of criticism, judicial opinions
dominate the enterprise. Even statutes are assigned cautiously, resisted by
students, and taught gingerly. Students rarely read the social science that
public policy should consult and regularly leave law school without encountering a serious analysis of how a legal doctrine actually works. Unhappily,
scholars do not write such analyses, law teachers are often uninterested in
them, 19 and authors cannot squeeze them into casebooks.
Legal practice hardly remedies these defects of legal training. Lawyers
today, particularly elite lawyers, tend to specialize narrowly. And for most
lawyers even a general practice is a narrow enterprise. Thus it is possibleit is common-to be appointed to the bench without ever having administered an organization, met a payroll, run a public program, stood for office,
or served in a legislature. Judges' social experience is likely to be narrow as
well. Most elite judges were born into, and all of them live among, the comfortable classes. As a multimillionaire jurist once lamented to me, "I'm always the poorest man in any room I'm in." 20
Once anointed, judges become genuine generalists, assigned to resolve
a breathtaking range of problems. Legislators may specialize; judges cannot.
Legislators serve on specialized committees with expert staffs. Judges have
only a few "clerks" who have just graduated from law school, and they cannot consult experts out of court. Some judges even try to limit their social
contacts to preserve their dispassion. In their work they lead lives of quiet
preparation. In sum, judges suffer the narrowness of the generalist.
All this means judges often know little about the issues of public policy
they must resolve and have little experience analyzing public policy issues in
any but doctrinal terms. Yet the way courts acquire and analyze information
does little to ameliorate this ignorance and inexperience. The only judge
who participates in finding facts is the trial judge. But trial judges have little
control over what facts are discovered, for it is primarily the lawyers' responsibility to investigate the relevant facts and to introduce them into evidence.
Yet trial lawyers suffer from the same impoverished training and experience judges do. They are specialists at litigation who must educate themselves about every new case. Furthermore, their allegiance is not to the
truth, but to the client, so that they typically introduce only evidence favorable to their clients. The range of opinions and information the judge hears
thus depends on who the clients are. If they do not represent the full range
of interested parties-and they rarely do-relevant positions will go unexplored. (Hospices, for instance, were not litigants in Glucksberg.) All this is
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troublesome enough when the question is only whether some fact occurred.
It is crippling when the issue is whether some policy is wise. Such a question
requires analyses of complex data that can essentially be introduced only
through expert witnesses. In American litigation, these witnesses are ordinarily paid by the parties, and paid to be partisan. Finally, the quantity and
quality of the information lawyers introduce depend on the (markedly variable) competence of the lawyers and the wealth of their clients (and on the
rules of evidence).
In American law, appellate judges depend on the information trial courts
gather. Appellate judges may not make inquiries of their own and in any event
have neither time nor taste for doing so. They primarily rely on the parties'
briefs and perhaps a joint appendix that reprints a few slivers of the record.
(Although judges are entitled to summon the whole record, they rarely do.)
Other affected parties may submit amicus curiae briefs, although they need
not and although judges rarely read them. No judge is polymath enough to be
well informed on all the kinds of cases that come before a court. Courts, in
other words, make social policy on the basis of "executive summaries."
The result of all this is that appellate courts regularly fail to understand
the nature of the institutions and practices for which they make rules, even
when those institutions and practices are legal ones. Thus, one fascinating
study of the way courts actually deal with criminals concluded that the
Supreme Court's decisions "overlook (1) the nature of courts as formal organization; (2) the relationship that the lawyer-regular actually has with the
court organization; and (3) the character of the lawyer-client relationship in
the criminal court (the routine relationships, not those unusual ones that
are described in 'heroic' terms in novels, movies, and TV)." 21 As another
commentator puts it, "American jurists of criminal law rarely study the reality of the American criminal justice system but potter happily away in an
Alice-in-Wonderland world where defendants with competent lawyers go on
trial and argue strenuously about mens rea or the rules of evidence or the
exact weight or implication of the guarantees in the Bill of Rights. "22
Once again, the contrast with legislators is illuminating. In a well-run
legislature, bills are turned over to a specialized committee. Its expert staff
prepares reports and interviews witnesses who represent a range of interests
and views. At hearings, legislators may ask whatever questions they wish (or
are prompted to ask by their staff). Legislators may also interrogate anyone
they choose about the controversy. And legislators properly heed public debates and are properly the subject of lobbying (which would be improper ex
parte contact were a judge approached).
For all the reasons I have described, then, systematic empirical information rarely intrudes itself into the labors of appellate judges. Even when
it does, however, courts all too often dismiss it. As David Faigman says in
his extended study of the problem, "Historically, most constitutional factfinding depended on the Justices' best guess about the matter." 23 Faigman
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notes, for example, that the Court asked for research on whether excluding
jurors who oppose the death penalty biases juries in favor of conviction. Nevertheless, in Lockhart v McCree, the Court dismissed the consequent outpouring of research on the ground that it did not meet the Court's high standards of empirical verification, a dismissal Faigman attributes in considerable
part to the Court's failure to understand how social science works. 24
Perhaps my point about the ability of courts to assimilate information
may be made more concrete by being made more personal:
In the Chambers of the justice for whom I clerked, the burden of the
Court's work meant that cases were handled like this: The justice
would read the parties' briefs in each case; the three clerks divided the
argued cases among them. Before oral argument, the clerks and the
justice would discuss the cases. The justice would listen to the oral arguments, and the Court would deliberate and vote privately. If my justice was assigned to write the opinion, the clerk who had worked on
the case would draft it. He had ten days in which to do so. In that
time, he continued to read briefs and to write memoranda to the justice on the petitions to hear cases that kept pouring into the Court.
When the clerk was finished drafting the opinion, the justice would
read it over and edit it lightly. 25
In this section, I have been asking whether there are a priori reasons to
think judges will make good biomedical policy. I have suggested that the
Constitution is not a rich source of relevant wisdom, that the Court has not
developed constitutional doctrine that provides a cogent and workable analytic framework, that little in the training and experience of judges suits
them to make public policy, and that courts are poorly organized to collect
the kind of information and analysis on which successful policy ordinarily
rests. In short, there are excellent reasons to doubt courts will make good
bioethical policy through constitutional adjudication.

Policy Analysis and the State Interests:
The Example of Compassion in Dying

I now want to look at one ambitious judicial attempt to make bioethical policy through constitutional adjudication to see how well courts actually succeed at it: by their fruits ye shall know them. My example, of course, is the
Ninth Circuit's en bane opinion in Compassion in Dying v Washington. 26
For brevity's sake, I will ignore the court's arguments about whether Washington's statute infringed some constitutional interest and concentrate on
the court's analysis of the interests the state advanced to justify its statute. I
will do so because the arguments deriving such a right have already been
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lengthily criticized while the state-interest arguments have generally been
scanted and because the court's treatment of the state's interests exemplifies the judicial incapacities I have been discussing. 27
In this part, I make two central arguments. The first is that courts typically fail to take states' interests seriously enough. 28 My second central argument is that courts often are poorly informed about the policies they are
making. The Ninth Circuit analyzed Compassion in Dying at uncommon
length. Yet it repeatedly seems to have misunderstood the facts and arguments basic to its decision. To demonstrate this, I will examine the court's
treatment of each of the state's principal interests.
The First State Interest: The Unqualified Interest
in Life
The Ninth Circuit began by acknowledging what the Supreme Court said in
Cruzan: "The state may assert an unqualified interest in preserving life in
general. "29 The court rejected this interest for two reasons. Its first reason
was one that it returned to at several points and that was also the basis for
the Second Circuit's decision in Quill v Vacco: 30
[T]he state of Washington has already decided that its interest in preserving life should ordinarily give way-at least in the case of competent, terminally ill adults who are dependent on medical treatment-to
the wishes of the patients. In its Natural Death Act, ... Washington
permits adults to have "life-sustaining treatment withheld or withdrawn in instances of a terminal condition or permanent unconsciousness. "31
The first problem with this argument is that Washington need not have
"decided" its interest in life should give way. Rather, it might only have concluded that the principle of Cruzan compelled it to permit people to refuse
medical treatment. In other words, the state may have believed people are
constitutionally entitled to resist bodily intrusions, even if those intrusions
are livesaving. But the state might still have retained an interest in preserving life that it wished to assert in any permissible way.
The second problem with the court's argument lies in its view of doctors' motives: "In disconnecting a respirator, ... a doctor is unquestionably
committing an act; he is taking an active role in bringing about the patient's
death. In fact, there can be no doubt that in such instances the doctor intends that, as the result of his action, the patient will die an earlier death
than he otherwise would." 32 The court is-characteristically-confident, but
it is wrong. The doctor need not intend anything of the kind, often will intend nothing of the kind, knows that predictions about disconnecting respirators are perilous (as the case of Karen Ann Quinlan famously demonstrated), and may hope the patient will survive. Nor is it obvious that

Making Biomedical Policy through Constitutional Adjudication · 173
patients-who often cling to the wispiest hopes-want to die when they refuse treatment.
The court thought it was "not possible to distinguish prohibited from
permissible medical conduct" in a second way: "[D]octors have been supplying the causal agent of patients' death for decades. Physicians routinely and
openly provide medication to terminally ill patients with the knowledge that
it will have a 'double effect."' 33 The doctrine of double effect is the principle
"that a single act having two foreseen effects, one good and one harmful
(such as death), is not always morally prohibited if the harmful effect is not
intended. "34 The doctrine is commonly invoked to justify providing medication to relieve pain even though the medication is also likely to cause death
as long as "the physician's provision of medication ... [is] intended to relieve
grave pain and suffering and [is] not intended to hasten death." 35
The Ninth Circuit surely was not required to accept the doctrine of double effect. But it was required to understand it and the consequences of rejecting it. Nevertheless, the court rushed headlong from the possibility that
a doctor's action may cause death to the certainty that death must be the
doctor's goal: "To us, what matters most is that the death of the patient is the
intended result as surely in one case as in the other." 36 The court does not
seem to grasp that a doctor may know death is a risk without being certain it
will happen or wanting it to. The court's misunderstanding may flow partly
from its medical naivete. As one physician (and proponent of assisted suicide) writes, "[C]aregivers experienced in hospice settings know that it is extremely difficult to produce a fatal overdose by increasing the amount of opioid administered to a patient suffering pain. This is especially true when the
agent is titrated with care and when the patient has been receiving an opioid
long enough to build up tolerance." 37
Not only does the court misperceive the motives doctors and patients
must have in terminating medical treatment or in seeking relief from pain,
it seems not to have considered the consequences of equating those acts
with suicide. If any refusal of treatment that might prolong life is suicide, a
person or state that opposes suicide must undergo or demand extremes of
treatment no one would think sensible. And if pain relief that runs some risk
of causing death were called murder, how many doctors would treat pain adequately? No wonder an observer as sober and serious as John Arras calls the
court's rejection of the doctrine of double effect "reckless and counterproductive." He explains, "[M]any physicians would sooner give up their allegiance to adequate pain control than their opposition to assisted suicide and
euthanasia. If they are convinced by the judge's reasoning, many will be reluctant to practice adequate pain control techniques on their dying patients. "38
The court also depreciated the state's general interest in life because
that interest "is dramatically diminished if the person it seeks to protect is
terminally ill or permanently comatose and has expressed a wish that he be
permitted to die without further medical treatment. ... "39 But the court
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failed to explain satisfactorily why the state's interest is diminished by someone's decision to die, and the Supreme Court did not agree that it is: "As we
have previously affirmed, the States 'may properly decline to make judgments about the "quality" of life that a particular individual may
enjoy ... ' .... This remains true, as Cruzan makes clear, even for those who
are near death. "40
The court acknowledged that the state might be deterred from permitting assisted suicide by the difficulty of defining "terminally ill." However,
the court so confidently assumed a workable definition is easily devised:
We acknowledge that it is sometimes impossible to predict with certainty the duration of a terminally ill patient's remaining existence,
just as it is sometimes impossible to say for certain whether a borderline individual is or is not mentally competent. However, we believe
that sufficient safeguards can and will be developed by the state and
medical profession ... to ensure that the possibility of error will ordinarily be remote. 41
This implies that the problem is that doctors may apply the definition ofterminally ill inaccurately. That is certainly a concern, given the relentless uncertainty of medical predictions and the notorious variability of medical
practice. But the problem lies not just in applying the definition-it lies in
devising it. The court scoffs at the "purported definitional difficulties" on the
grounds that they "have repeatedly been surmounted." 42 The court's evidence is that states have enacted definitions of "terminal" into law. But that
is no answer if the definitions are bad ones. Unfortunately, there is a reason
to doubt the present state of knowledge permits reliable definition. One wellinformed study reports that
every criterion has very serious problems and complexities, even in a
population for whom good models for predicting survival is available.
The number of long-term survivors increases when more inclusive criteria are applied while the number of very early deaths increases when
more restrictive criteria are used. No statistical criterion seems to capture only the population which was really intended. 43
Thus this study concluded, "Deciding who should be counted 'terminally ill'
will pose such severe difficulties that it seems untenable as a criterion for
permitting physician-assisted suicide. Allowing physicians (or anyone else)
to decide who is terminally ill without standards or guidance will result in
uneven application with unjustified variations across diseases, across physicians, and across regions. "44 In short, the Ninth Circuit seems to have been
unaware of the evidence that "[h ]ighly accurate predictive models of survival
are difficult to create, harder to apply, scanty in number, flawed in practice,
and impossible in theory." 45
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The Second State Interest:
Preventing Erroneous Decisions
The Ninth Circuit conceded that "the state has a clear interest in preventing anyone, no matter what age, from taking his own life in a fit of desperation, depression, or loneliness or as a result of any other problem, physical or
psychological, which can be significantly ameliorated." 46 However, the court
said that "that interest ... is substantially diminished in the case of terminally ill, competent adults who wish to die. "47 Here the Ninth Circuit apparently misunderstood both the state's argument and the world of the dying.
The court seemed to think the state was simply trying to prevent suicide. But
the state was arguing that a decision to commit suicide made under the influence of mind-warping pressures is not autonomous. 48 In other words, the
state interest at issue was not a general interest in preventing suicide, but a
more particular interest in preventing suicides that result from "decision defects."49
Although its opinion turns on the principle of autonomy, the court is
largely indifferent to the problem of decision defects. Yet that problem is severe for all patients and crucial for terminally ill patients contemplating suicide. Thus Herbert Hendin, a leading student of suicide, writes, "Llke other
suicidal individuals, patients who desire an early death during a serious or
terminal illness are usually suffering from a treatable mental illness; most
commonly a depressive condition or alcoholism. "50 Depression is notoriously
unrecognized by its sufferers and those around them, particularly when, as
for the dying, it is easy to identify a reason for sorrow. Worse, "depression is
underdiagnosed and often inadequately treated. Although most people who
kill themselves are under medical care at the time of death, their physicians
often fail to recognize the symptoms of depressive illness or to provide adequate treatment for the illness." 51
More broadly, the court seems afflicted with a naive view of human motivation, one that does not appreciate how complex, ambiguous, and ambivalent people's motives commonly are. The motives of the seriously ill have
all those characteristics and are further roiled by the fatigue, fear, pressures,
and disorientation disease wreaks on its sufferers. 52 All these problems are
exacerbated by the confrontation with mortality. Thus Hendin writes, "Clinicians and researchers working with patients who request assisted suicide
during an illness have described the patients as having the same intense
emotions, such as hopelessness, despair, anxiety, rage and guilt, seen in suicidal patients without physical illness." 53 These emotions conduce to illconsidered decisions. Thus Stengel comments that many "suicidal attempts
and quite a few suicides are carried out in the mood 'I don't care whether I
live or die,' rather than with a clear and unambiguous determination to end
life .... Most people, in committing a suicidal act, are just as muddled as
they are whenever they do anything of importance under emotional
stress." 54
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In addition, requests for suicide may be motivated by desires that can be
less harshly satisfied. Hendin, for instance, suggests that losing their sense
of control drives some patients to try to fix the time and circumstances of
their deaths. 55 If so, providing them with other kinds of power may satisfy
their wish for control. 56 Similarly, Hendin reports, "The vast majority of patients who request assisted suicide or euthanasia are motivated primarily by
the dread of what will happen to them in the dying process rather than by
their current pain or suffering.... When these fears are dealt with by a caring, sensitive physician, the patient's requests for death usually disappear." 57
Hendin also believes patients requesting help committing suicide, "like
other suicidal individuals, are often testing the affection and care of others.
The overwhelming number of patients drop the request to die, however, if
their anxieties are dealt with sensitively and effectively." 58
If these are the kinds of reasons patients request help committing suicide, it is unsurprising that the "desire for death is variable over time even
for patients who are terminally ill. This is true even among the small number of terminally ill patients expressing a persistent wish to die. When interviewed two weeks later, two-thirds of these patients show a significant decrease in the extent of the desire to die." 59 It is commonly observed that,
"once patients are confronted with illness, continued life often becomes
more precious; given access to appropriate relief from pain and other debilitating symptoms, many of those who consider suicide during the course of
a terminal illness abandon their desire for a quicker death in favor of a
longer life made more tolerable with effective treatment. "60 Such changes of
heart are experienced by patients of all kinds, not just the dying. For example, one patient-Wilfrid Sheed-learned that "cancer, even more than
polio, has a disarming way of bargaining downward, beginning with your
whole estate and then letting you keep the game warden's cottage or the
badminton court; and by the time it has tried to frighten you to death and
threatened to take away your very existence, you'd be amazed at how little
you're willing to settle for." 61
In sum, there is much evidence that a disturbing number of terminally
ill patients considering suicide are not making truly autonomous decisions.
Depression is a predominant motive for seeking assistance in suicide even
among the terminally ill. It is generally treatable, but it is often not diagnosed
by doctors. People seeking suicide are often in the grip of emotions they do
not understand and are pursuing goals that can be met in less drastic ways.
The wish to commit suicide is often inconstant. In short, decision defects
plague decisions to die. Perhaps all this evidence is not incontrovertible. But
it is the kind of evidence a state might reasonably adduce to support the interests it advances. Just such evidence in fact influenced the New York State
Task Force on Llfe and the Law to recommend that assisted suicide not be
legally permitted. 62
Had the court accorded this evidence the respect it warranted, the
court would not just have taken the decision-defects argument more seriously. It might also have understood how challenging the state's argument
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was to the court's view of the case. For the state was not just invoking a paternalistic interest in protecting its citizens. Rather, it was asserting an interest in promoting its citizens' autonomy, in protecting people from being
led into making decisions that are not autonomous. In its strongest form, the
state's argument was that on balance prohibiting assisted suicide serves autonomy better than permitting it. This would be true if-put crudely-more
people would be kept by the prohibition from nonautonomously committing
suicide than would autonomously decide to commit suicide were it legal. In
short, the court's crucial premise-that the choice was between autonomy
and paternalism-was wrong. Rather, the choice was between two views of
how to promote autonomous decisions.
But why was the court-which elsewhere in its opinion was shocked at
any interference with autonomy-so indifferent to the state's arguments on
behalf ofit? While the court acknowledged that "many suicides are committed by people who are suffering from treatable mental disorders," 63 it implied
that suicides by the terminally ill are different: "In the case of a terminally ill
adult who ends his life in the final stages of an incurable and painful degenerative disease, in order to avoid debilitating pain and a humiliating death,
the decision to commit suicide is not senseless .... "64 And the court said that
should an error "in medical or legal judgment" occur (a possibility the court
thought "remote" 65), it would be "likely to benefit the individual by permitting a victim of unmanageable pain and suffering to end his life peacefully
and with dignity at the time he deems most desirable." 66 Apparently, then,
the court thought suicide the rational response to terminal illness.
The court, in other words, appears to espouse the view I suspect many
people credit-that suicide is a normal response to terminal illness and that
the terminally ill who want to commit suicide thus differ sharply from other
suicidal people. This may be a common view, but there is good reason to
doubt it (particularly if you do not assume, as the court seems to, that every
terminally ill person who wants to commit suicide is in unbearable, untreatable pain). As I have been suggesting, even terminally ill people who consider suicide often change their minds when some of their other problems
are ameliorated. And "only a small percentage of terminally ill or severely ill
patients attempt or commit suicide." 67
But even if suicide were the rational response to terminal illness, it
would still be surprising that the court could be so unconcerned about decision defects. A standard argument for patient's autonomy is exactly that people's views of rationality differ, and that each person's view should be respected. ls, then, the court concerned for autonomy, or is it animated by a
view of how the dying should act? 68
The Third State Interest: Preventing Undue Influence
The third state interest the Ninth Circuit acknowledged was protecting the
dying from arbitrary, unfair, or undue influence. The court dismissed the
possibility of two kinds of danger. First, it jeered at the argument that pro-
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hibiting assisted suicide is necessary "to protect the disadvantaged." 69 The
court, however, hardly bothered to explain why that argument is "disingenuous," "fallacious," and "meretricious," and it rushed on to say "there is far
more reason to raise the opposite concern-that the poor would be denied
'the assistance that would allow them to end their lives with a measure of
dignity."' 70 The court expressed itself obscurely, but it apparently reasoned
that assisted suicide is a medical service, that the poor get fewer medical
services than the rich, and that therefore the poor will have less access
to help in committing suicide. The state's argument, however, was that
those caring for the poor will be too ready to acquiesce in their suicide because (a) they regard the lives of the poor as less valuable than other lives
and (b) helping the poor die is cheaper than keeping them alive. The court
never grapples with (a) and seems never to grasp (b).
The court did admit there is reason to worry "that infirm, elderly persons will come under undue pressure to end their lives from callous, financially burdened, or self-interested relatives, or others who have influence
over them." 71 The court said it did "not minimize the concern." 72 Perhaps
not, but neither did it evince much understanding of it. The concern, of
course, is that debilitated and desperate people are suggestible: "[D]emoralization and lack of assertiveness are likely to make the terminally ill patient
more vulnerable to the suggestions of others .... "73 The primary point is not
(as the court implies) that patients will be hustled off by hard-hearted or
grasping doctors and relatives. It is more centrally that "[w]ell-meaning and
discreet suggestions, or even unconscious changes in expression, gesture,
and tone of voice, can move a dependent and suggestible patient toward a
choice for death." 74 It is that families-wearied financially, psychologically,
and morally by the trials of caring for someone gravely ill-might yearn for
the patient to ease them of their burden. In this light, it is disturbing that, according to one study of the Dutch experience "more euthanasia requests
came from the families of patients than the patients themselves. The investigator for the study concluded that the families, the doctors and the nurses
were involved in pressuring the patients to request euthanasia. "75
This is troubling, of course, on autonomy grounds. The rationale for a
right to assisted suicide is deference to the patient's choice, but that rationale is defeated where the patient was pressured into committing suicide. But
it is troubling on another ground as well, for families' distress can sometimes
be satisfied less drastically: "A 1989 Swedish study revealed that when
chronically ill patients attempted suicide, their overburdened families often
did not want them resuscitated. When social services stepped in and relieved the family's burden by sending in home care helpers, most patients
wanted to live and their families wanted them to live as well. "76
The changing structure of American medical care provides additional
reason to worry about pressures to choose death. American health care is
being transformed by the rise of managed care and cost containment. We
are thus moving from a system in which it was generally in doctors' financial
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interest to overtreat patients toward one in which doctors have incentives to
undertreat them. Both systems have their failings, and it is hardly obvious
that the old system was better for patients. 77 But any decision to permit assisted suicide needs to consider that the new system gives doctors direct financial reasons to persuade their patients to die. 78 Once again, however, the
Ninth Circuit was either ignorant or indifferent.
The Ninth Circuit did, however, have another string to its bow. Its principal response to concerns that people might be pressured into committing
suicide, as to concerns about whether patients might commit suicide improvidently, was that doctors will regulate these decisions. So crucial is this
argument that it deserves quoting at length:
We believe that most, if not all, doctors would not assist a terminally ill
patient to hasten his death as long as there were any reasonable chance
of alleviating the patient's suffering or enabling him to live under tolerable conditions. We also believe that physicians would not assist a patient to end his life if there were any significant doubt about the patient's true wishes. To do so would be contrary to the physicians'
fundamental training, their conservative nature, and the ethics of their
profession. In any case, since doctors are highly-regulated professionals, it should not be difficult for the state or the profession itself to establish rules and procedures that will ensure that the occasional negligent or careless recommendation by a licensed physician will not result
in an uninformed or erroneous decision by the patient or his family. 79
It is hard to know where to start analyzing this astonishing statement.
Perhaps we may begin by observing that the court does not trouble to provide
evidence for it. 80 But evidence is acutely needed, for the court's propositions
are, at best, suspect. Even the court's colorable assumption that doctors are
"highly-regulated professionals" is dubious. Doctors certainly feel tightly regulated, and bitterly many of them resent it. 81 When doctors talk of assisted
suicide, they often assert some kind of entitlement to do what they believe is
best for their patients and are incredulous when told the law might claim to
influence their judgment. But is medicine "highly regulated"? The very definition of a profession is that it is crucially self-regulating, and few professions have been as concerned to preserve that prerogative or as triumphant
in doing so as medicine. 82 Law is ordinarily tamely respectful of that prerogative. 83 When it regulates medicine-medical malpractice doctrine is a crucial example-it generally accepts medicine's own standards. Even where
the law has powerful reasons to regulate-for example, when disciplining incompetent doctors-it is notoriously feeble. Courts have been particularly
loath to be saddled with decisions at the end of life and have preferred to set
broad standards rather than adjudicate individual cases.
The Ninth Circuit's assumption that doctors are highly regulated is especially odd in an area where doctors have so flagrantly violated the law with
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such impunity. When Timothy Quill admitted in a preeminent medical journal that he had helped a patient commit suicide, he was investigated but
not prosecuted. 84 A few miles down the road from where I write, Jack
Kevorkian's toll has now passed one hundred. He was thrice prosecuted for
assisting with suicides but never convicted. 85 Only when he delivered a tape
of himself in flagrante delicto to 60 Minutes and stripped himself of legal
counsel was he convicted of murder. Oh law, where is thy sting?
The Ninth Circuit might have recalled that the law's enforcement problem is old and ubiquitous, that people do not obey just because the law commands. 86 The enforcement problem is harshest in cases like those involving
medical decisions-where an activity occurs in private, where the people the
law wants to influence feel the decision is theirs to make, 87 where the only
person keeping records is the person regulated, and where the victim is dead
and cannot complain. 88
The Ninth Circuit explains its sang-froid about improvident decisions
to commit suicide partly by saying concern about undue influence "is ameliorated in large measure because of the mandatory involvement in the
decision-making process of physicians, who have a strong bias in favor of
preserving life .... "89 Here the court appears to accept an increasingly outmoded version of doctors' attitudes toward treating the dying. It was long regretted that doctors would strive officiously to keep patients alive. But this
criticism is becoming anachronistic. More and more it is doctors who start
discussions of stopping treatment, and understandably. 90 Horribly ill people
who cannot improve are rarely rewarding patients. And the treatments that
keep them alive often distress all concerned.
But the court need not have rested its decision on how much doctors
are regulated or how resolutely they wish to keep patients alive, for there are
many concrete factors it could have consulted and much evidence it might
have evaluated. The court professed to be "aware of the concern that doctors
become hardened to the inevitability of death and to the plight of terminally
ill patients, and that they will treat requests to die in a routine and impersonal manner, rather than affording the careful, thorough, individualized attention that each request deserves. "91 But those concerns are much more
specific and troubling even than this. What the court asks of doctors is more
challenging than the court realizes. For example, "the detection ofjudgmentimpairing confusion among dying people is surprisingly difficult .... [O]ne
researcher concluded that 'our clinical observations miss profound confusional episodes in [20%] of our patients."' 92 Not only do "physicians and
nurses regularly overstate dying patients' decision-making competence," but
there is currently "inadequate experience or research data to design reliable
safeguards to ensure the lucidity of dying patients who might claim a right to
assisted suicide. "93
Bluntly phrased, the question the court should have asked was this: If
doctors will supervise suicides so well, why do they so often treat the dying
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so badly? As Howard Brody writes, "It has been exhaustively documented
that medical management of terminal suffering is currently inadequate." 94
Indeed, he says there is "compelling evidence that the status quo is far below
optimal, if not actually scandalous. "95 More specifically, it is notorious that
too many doctors are poorly trained to recognize depression, that they often
undertreat pain, and communicate badly with patients. And most relevantly,
who believes doctors do an exemplary job oflearning and heeding the wishes
of dying patients? The Ninth Circuit
apparently assumes that clinicians faithfully adhere to patients' wishes
in treatment decisions, including end-of-life care. But there is disturbing evidence that this is not so .... [In the] SUPPORT [study,] ...
fewer than one-fourth of treating physicians had ever reviewed the patient's preferences, even when these were explicitly written down in
an advance directive. Even when patients' preferences were known,
they were frequently simply ignored. 96
Doctors fail in the duties they already owe dying patients and seem fated
to fail as guardians of patients' decisions to die for many-often understandable-reasons. Routine dulls sympathy, as Rousseau knew long ago: "When
we have seen a sight it ceases to impress us, use is second nature, what is always before our eyes no longer appeals to the imagination, and it is only
through the imagination that we can feel the sorrows of others; this is why
priests and doctors who are always beholding death and suffering become so
hardened. "97 The frustrations and irritations of unresponsive and unrewarding patients can defeat even dedicated doctors, for "physicians do in fact get
tired of treating patients who are hard to cure, who resist their best efforts,
who are on their way down-especially when they have had no long-term relationship with them over many years. 'Gorks,' 'gamers,' and 'vegetables' are
only some of the less-than-affectionate names such patients receive from
the interns and residents." 98 Finally, the delicate decisions the Ninth Circuit
wants from doctors are especially elusive when doctors are intensely busyas many chronically are.
Hardening of sympathies is an unavoidable problem even under good
circumstances. But what happens when suicide becomes a right doctors are
commanded to respect? The court expects doctors to find the elusive line
between honoring the patient's "right to die" and ensuring patients do not
make "unfree" decisions. But the lessons of reform are rarely learned in
such subtle ways. As I once wrote, "People can usually follow the letter of a
new rule, but its spirit is harder to capture." 99 Many doctors learn only crude
lessons from bioethics-tell patients the truth (always); accede to patient's
decisions to withdraw treatment (always). Doctors who have so long been
castigated for their paternalism thus seem likely to err on the side of deferring to assertions of the right to die. The court expects doctors to spot defec-
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tive decisions because suicide now seems so heterodox. But as it became
routine and blessed by the authority of a constitutional right it would become
normal and would evoke less anxiety and scrutiny.
Even the most sensitive doctor may be perplexed at the task of supervision the court blithely imposes. For how should a doctor answer when a patient asks for help committing suicide? How hard, if at all, should a doctor
try to dissuade the patient? Is dissuasion an improper attempt to manipulate
what should be an autonomous decision? A way of helping patients evaluate
their situation more intensely and thus of enhancing patients' autonomy? Or
is it a way of making sure the patient's decision is free, informed, and irrevocable? And when, if at all, should a doctor propose, or even mention, assisted suicide? 100 Is proposing it a duty commanded by the doctrine of informed consent every time the patient is eligible for it? Is any mention of it
inherently a suggestion? What implications would that suggestion have?
That the patient's life is not worth living? That the patient is a burden? That
the case is hopeless? That the doctor wants to give up? Should the burden
always be on the patient to make the first suggestion?
The court's faith that doctors will prevent improvident or pressured decisions to commit suicide ignores yet another problem. Any time the medical
profession is made the gatekeeper to something people want and feel entitled to (abortions, draft deferments, letters verifying an employee's disability) a few doctors will be driven by ideology or economics to provide it, often
uncritically and even zealously. Only a few such doctors are needed to make
the service widely available. Jack Kevorkian is a gruesome example, but
Hendin observes, "Although Kevorkian may seem eccentric, it is worth
knowing that in the Netherlands, a small number of physicians are attracted
to euthanasia and do a great number of cases." 101
This brings us to our most direct evidence about how well doctors might
supervise assisted suicide-Holland. As Hendin notes, "The Dutch model
and Dutch guidelines have been accepted as models for the Oregon law and
most of the state laws being considered in this country to legalize assisted
suicide and euthanasia." 102 Reliable information about the Dutch experiment is elusive, and interpretations ofit differ. Nevertheless, there is reason
to fear that Dutch doctors regulate these decisions poorly, that "[v]irtually
every guideline established by the Dutch, whether it be a voluntary, wellconsidered, persistent request; intolerable suffering that cannot be relieved;
consultation; or the reporting of cases, has failed to protect patients or has
been modified or violated with impunity." 103
One homely test of the doctor's role as supervisor of suicide comes from
a model case of assisted suicide-the story of how Timothy Quill helped his
patient "Diane" to die. 104 Quill is a prominent exponent of assisted suicide
(indeed, he is the Quill of Quill v Vacca). His account of Diane's story has
widely been thought to exemplify what laudable medical care would be like
were assisted suicide legal. That account describes a sorrowful physician
yielding to his patient's exercise of her autonomy. Yet in a penetrating and
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disturbing study of that account, Patricia Wesley shows in some detail how
dubious it is. She concludes that "[f]ar from being the neutral reflector and
facilitator of Diane's desires that he believes himself to be, Dr. Quill in fact
powerfully and directly shapes those desires." 105
I have been suggesting that one reason the Ninth Circuit was confident
doctors could safeguard decisions to commit suicide is that it did not understand what it was asking doctors to do or how they would react. There may
be another reason-the court did not have to write the regulations for the
new regime. Instead, it could airily say, "Any of several model statutes might
serve as an example of how these legitimate and important concerns can be
addressed effectively." 106 Perhaps it is only when an institution must actually
develop (and administer?) regulations that it realizes their perplexities. The
Ninth Circuit could spare itself that burden and hence the trouble of clearer,
harder thought.
In sum, the Ninth Circuit would make doctors the guardians of the decision to commit suicide. Why, then, did it not ask the old question, Quis custodiet ipsos custodes? We ask that question not because the guardians are
untrustworthy (although some will be), but because we recognize the difficulty of their job. It is that difficulty with which the court declines to grapple.
The Fourth State Interest: Protecting the Integrity
of the Medical Profession
The Ninth Circuit did "not believe that the integrity of the medical profession would be threatened in any way by the vindication of the liberty interest
at issue here." On the contrary, "it is the existence of a statute that criminalizes the provision of medical assistance to patients in need that could create conflicts with the doctors' professional obligations and make covert criminals out of honorable, dedicated, and compassionate individuals." 107 The
court reasoned, "The assertion that the legalization of physician-assisted suicide will erode the commitment of doctors to help their patients rests both
on an ignorance of what numbers of doctors have been doing for a considerable time and on a misunderstanding of the proper function of a physician. "!Os
The court's reference to what doctors are already doing is a restatement
of the court's belief that doctors are helping patients commit suicide (are
killing patients?) when they withdraw treatment needed to prolong life. I
have already criticized this argument, so we need now say only that this is
not what doctors or patients understand doctors to be doing and that those
understandings speak to the state's argument about the integrity of the medical profession. For the state's argument is that doctors who think they are
assisting in their patients' suicide will regard those patients differently from
doctors who believe they would never do so and that patients who believe
their doctors would never assist in their suicide can trust their doctors more
freely than patients who are denied that confidence.
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The court's explanation of "the proper function of a physician" is obscure. Perhaps most mystifying is its statement that "experience shows that
most doctors can readily adapt to a changing legal climate. Once the Court
held that a woman has a constitutional right to have an abortion, doctors
began performing abortions routinely and the ethical integrity of the medical
profession remained undiminished." 109 This is mystifying on two levels.
First, not everyone would agree that the ethical integrity of the medical profession is undiminished. Kass and Lund, for example, see
good reasons to argue the contrary. Massive numbers of abortions are
now being performed, far beyond what was originally expected, and for
reasons not originally regarded as appropriate. Moreover, physician acceptance of abortion may in fact be partly responsible for recent weakenings in the professions's repugnance to cause death .... [O]ne of the
arguments offered twenty-five years ago against allowing doctors to
perform abortions was that it would inevitably lead to doctors performing euthanasia. 110
Second, the question is not whether doctors will "adapt to a changing legal
climate." It is whether that changing climate will be regrettable. First, how
will patients regard doctors with a license to kill? Ours is an age of distrust.
It is also an age when we must trust even strangers. As medical care is bureaucratized, our doctors become such strangers, strangers to whom we
confide our health and even our lives. In these circumstances, one assurance patients may value is the knowledge that doctors will not, cannot, kill.
The justice of these fears is suggested by a second concern-that doctors may be disquieted and even corrupted by the power and practice of euthanasia. The Ninth Circuit was sanguine about the effect of assisted suicide
on the profession because doctors already participate in their patients'
deaths. But this is all the more reason for concern. Conscientious doctors
worry deeply about their power, about how it hardens and distances them,
about their own motives; bioethicists have warned for years about the arrogance of power. Assisted suicide would inflame such concerns: "One physician who has worked for many years in a hospice caring for dying patients
put the matter most convincingly: 'Only because I knew that I could not and
would not kill my patients was I able to enter most fully and intimately into
caring for them as they lay dying."'lll And in this light it is troubling to read
Hendin's report:
A number of Dutch euthanasia advocates have admitted that practicing euthanasia with legal sanction has encouraged doctors to feel that
they can make life or death decisions without consulting patients.
Dutch euthanasia practitioners ask themselves the following question:
Would I want to live if I were the patient? The question not only implies that a physician has a right to make decisions about whose life is
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worth living, it also ignores considerable research that has shown that
doctor's [sic] consistently underestimate patient perceptions as to their
quality of life. 112

The Fifth State Interest: The Slippery Slope
Finally, the Ninth Circuit evaluated the state's slippery-slope argument-the
argument that legalizing assisted suicide will lead down a spiral of unintended consequences toward what the court invidiously refers to as "a parade of horribles." 113 The court contemns this suggestion: "This same nihilistic argument can be offered against any constitutionally-protected right
or interest .... In fact, the Court has never refused to recognize a substantive due process liberty right or interest merely because there were difficulties in determining when and how to limit its exercise or because others
might someday attempt to use it improperly. "114 It is hard to understand why
the slippery-slope argument is "nihilistic." Nihilism is the belief that all arguments are meaningless; people who invoke the slippery slope are saying
that one argument is bad and that others are not. Nor is it a compliment to
the Supreme Court to say it has been indifferent to slippery slopes. Part of
making good policy is considering where a policy might lead and how it might
be misused. In addition, concerns about slippery slopes have helped lead the
Supreme Court to decline to announce a constitutional right. 115 In short, the
Ninth Circuit should have asked whether legalizing assisted suicide would
cause intolerable slippery-slope problems. That should have led it to examine the three kinds of slippery slopes.
The first slope is the possibility that people who did not qualify for help
with suicide would nevertheless receive it. This could happen in two principal ways. First, doctors might try but fail to distinguish between qualified and
unqualified candidates. Second, doctors might not try to distinguish among
candidates. This is a familiar process. Legislatures once attempted to permit
only those abortions necessary to protect a woman's life or health. That line
did not hold and in some places was breached almost overnight. Similarly,
even judges in a state as Catholic as Massachusetts declined to make the inquiries the Supreme Court contemplated when it established rules in Bellotti v Baird 116 governing the ability of minors to obtain abortions. 117 Llkewise, states long sought to make divorce available only on fault grounds, but
judges widely flouted that rule. 118
Llnes are fragile for many reasons. Not everyone will sympathize with a
line, and some who dislike it will breach it. Even people who approve of a
rule may find it easier to say yes than no or may find cases at the margin hard
to manage. The process of deciding a series of cases tends to shift the line,
since the most extreme case decided in the past tends to become the standard for the present. Furthermore, routine domesticates: a case that once
seemed uncomfortable soon becomes too familiar to justify attention. The
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regulations that sustain lines are particularly susceptible when they challenge a constitutional right, for such rights have so much moral force and
usually evoke so much judicial solicitude that they are hard to resist. As John
Arras remarks, "We have actually seen this script played out before in the
context of abortion law.... One regulatory constraint that had been placed
on women's choice in some jurisdictions was mandatory review by a hospitalbased committee .... [T]his regulatory mechanism, along with a host of others, was unceremoniously discarded by the Supreme Court. ... " 119
In short, there are good reasons to wonder how durable any line limiting assisted suicide would be. And there are special reasons to fear for the
line limiting it to competent, terminally ill adults who have made a free and
determined decision. These are the reasons we reviewed when we examined
the difficulties of defining "terminally ill," of ascertaining whether a patient
was competent to make a considered decision, of preventing patients from
choosing suicide under undue influence, and of making doctors the guarantors of regularity. To these excellent a priori reasons to doubt the line will
hold we must add the evidence that in Holland-the only jurisdiction with
real experience of such a line-it has been widely breached.
The first slippery-slope problem, then, is that the rules governing assisted
suicide might be applied unsoundly. The second slippery slope is the possibility that the principle the court employed to justify assisted suicide will be more
capacious than is necessary to accord competent, terminally ill patients a right
to the help of a doctor in committing suicide. 120 In other words, we must ask
whether the principle of Compassion in Dying leads beyond that limit and
would justify a constitutional right to voluntary euthanasia, or to nonvoluntary
euthanasia, or even to involuntary euthanasia. The answer is all too likely to be
yes. As Justice Holmes said, "All rights tend to declare themselves absolute
to their logical extreme." 121 And the Ninth Circuit recruits a notoriously
"greedy" 122 right, what is broadly if imprecisely called a right to "privacy," a
right "whose core principle seems endlessly expansive." 123 What is more, the
Ninth Circuit interprets that right aggressively. For example, the court
seemed to believe there is a fundamental right to make all "decisions that are
highly personal and intimate, as well as of great importance to the individual,"124 and it invoked the Supreme Court's most rapturous flights of rhetoric-like the celebrated passage from Casey I quoted earlier.
In sum, the second kind of slippery-slope argument suggests that the
Ninth Circuit's principle was too strong. It is thus strange that the court says,
"The question whether that type of physician conduct may be constitutionally prohibited must be answered directly in future cases, and not in this
one." 125 Courts may not decide cases not before them, but they should at
least peer down the road to see what lies ahead. This, after all, is why the
common law uses hypotheticals so lavishly-to accelerate the process of litigation to test a principle's force and valence. 126
The third kind of slippery slope raises the possibility that as courts interpret a new right, it will expand beyond its original justification. This pro-
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cess operates by small steps, often without judicial recognition that "rights
creep" is occurring. It is easy to imagine ways the right to assisted suicide
might slide down this slope. First, we would hear that anything that limits
the right is improper. In the zeal to prevent that impropriety, the scope of
the right itself would swell. Second, there would be equal protection arguments that people not eligible for assisted suicide were just as deserving as
those who were. 127 It would be said, for example, that there are only trivial
differences between the seriously and the terminally ill, or between the
physically ill and those suffering other kinds of miseries. It would be said that
people who are terminally ill but unable to kill themselves should not be denied a right other terminally ill people have. It would next be proposed that
people who were terminally ill but not mentally competent should have the
benefit of the right to commit suicide. If this seems far-fetched, one should
recall that in Cruzan Justice Brennan argued that if Cruzan could not exercise her "right to die" someone should exercise it for her. 128
Justice Brennan's position in Cruzan and Justice Stevens's as well exemplify how an idea can be unloosed from its moorings and slide in astonishing directions. The "right to die" was born as an expression of autonomism and antipaternalism. But that rationale could be transformed in a
blink into paternalism itself. Justice Brennan, for example, wanted to transmute Cruzan's right to make a decision for herself into her family's entitlement to guess what her decision would have been had she made one. And
Justice Stevens wanted to transmute Cruzan's right to make a decision into
her family's entitlement to do what they thought would be best for her. 129
These may be good policy choices, but not because Cruzan had an autonomy
right. Stripped of their autonomy language, these two opinions represent arguments for treating Cruzan benevolently, paternalistically .1 30
One might respond to the state's slippery-slope arguments by saying
that such arguments are logically dubious. If a first step is right, it is right
even though the second step is wrong. If the second step is wrong, it simply
should not be taken. But that should not prevent taking the first step, since
there is no logical reason the second step must be taken just because the first
one was. Indeed, there is a logical reason to stop before reaching the bottom,
since the whole argument assumes that the top of the slope is crucially different from the bottom. 131
Logically, this refutation of the slippery-slope argument seems convincing. But as Justice Holmes famously said, "The life of the law has not been
logic; it has been experience." And the American experience of law at the
end of life confirms the hazards of the slippery slope. This should not be surprising. First, slippery slopes are dangerous whatever the logic because of
the common law's method. The common law reasons from precedents. It
asks whether each new case is essentially the same as some precedent. If so,
it is decided in the same way. But if you decide a series of cases in the same
way because each case is almost the same as its predecessor, the end of the
series may wind up far distant from the beginning.
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Second, slippery slopes operate psychologically, not logically. "[T]hey
work partly by domesticating one idea and thus making its nearest neighbor
down the slope seem less extreme and unthinkable." 132 Yet a third reason we
slide down slippery slopes is that people are pushing us. Some Americans ardently want to change the law at the end of life. They well know that the public is afraid of the bottom of the slope; they have consciously calculated how
to move us down it by small steps.
Experience justifies the state's slippery-slope arguments. Over the past
few decades, the United States has moved from a reluctance even to withdraw medical treatment to serious proposals for active euthanasia, with assurances all along the way that each step was the last. My colleague Yale
Kamisar rightly asks, "If, as has been well said, 'the history of our activities
and beliefs concerning the ethics of death and dying is a history of lost distinctions of former significance,' what reason is there to think that the history will end when we sanction assisted suicide for the terminally ill?" 133
Holland's experiment with assisted suicide suggests that the American slide
would continue further than we might like: "Over the past two decades,
Dutch law and Dutch medicine have evolved from accepting assisted suicide
to accepting euthanasia, from euthanasia for terminally ill patients to euthanasia for chronically ill individuals, from euthanasia for physical illness to
euthanasia for psychological distress, and from voluntary euthanasia to the
practice and conditional acceptance of nonvoluntary and involuntary euthanasia. " 134 The Ninth Circuit's opinion itself exemplifies the slippery-slope
problem. That court says to Washington, you have slid thus far down the
slope, therefore it would be unconstitutional not to go much further. That
court refuses to consider just where the end of the slope might be. If the
court could not look at our history, or Holland's, it could at least have looked
to itself to see why it should not have dismissed the state's slippery-slope argument.
On Collective State Interests
The Ninth Circuit, I have been saying, had trouble with all the state's interests. However, it, like most courts, particularly scanted interests that do not
operate in a direct and obvious way on individual people, but that affect people collectively. Indeed, the court said: "If broad general state policies can be
used to deprive a terminally ill individual of the right to make that choice, it
is hard to envision where the exercise of arbitrary and intrusive power by the
state can be halted." 135 This is perverse. Broad and general policies often
promote basic and genuine social interests. 136
The Supreme Court does seem to recognize the importance of such interests. It believes, for example, that states may have "an 'unqualified interest in the preservation of human life,"' an interest which "is symbolic and aspirational as well as practical." 137 Unfortunately, it is not clear what the
Court means by a "symbolic and aspirational" interest or why it is important.
Let me suggest one possibility. Sometimes law cannot achieve its goals
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through direct regulations because effective law enforcement is not practicable. Law has "expressive" resources that may then be recruited. Law's expressive function, that is, seeks "not so much to influence behavior by requiring or forbidding people to perform a particular act, but to influence
behavior by encouraging people to think in a particular way. "138
Assisted-suicide statutes exemplify this expressive use of law. Killing
cannot be prevented solely through regulation, for people are not always deterred simply by fear of punishment, particularly when they have lively motives for killing. Rather, they must be led to internalize a norm against killing.
Given the forces opposing it, that norm must be exigent. The classic example of a deeply internalized, exigent norm is a taboo. A taboo is a prohibition
without exception, to which exceptions are unthinkable. Taboos work for
that reason. As soon as they are subject to rational analysis, as soon as qualifications and exceptions become permissible, their social, psychological,
and perhaps even moral force begins to crumble:
Taboos do not work rationally; they work by inducing reactions of horror and disgust at the prohibited practice. Rational analysis of taboos is
not only likely to miss this point, but even itself to weaken the taboo.
Once you begin to think[, for example,] about which kinds of incestlike activities lack particular identifiable harmful consequences for
particular identifiable participants, you begin to think about the unthinkable and about why some "incest" is harmless incest. As this process continues, the emotional force of the taboo, its force as a general
deterrent, is eroded. 139
"Thou shalt not kill" is a core taboo. As we begin to consider when it is
good deliberately to end a life without even the cloak of the justification that
it is the disease that is causing the death or that the death is an inadvertent
and undesired side effect of treating pain, the taboo against killing begins to
erode. When we begin to say killing is a question of each individual's values,
the erosion worsens.
Recent developments have already troubled the borderland between life
and death. For example, withdrawing medical treatment is today not only
normal, it is becoming virtuous. The rise of abortion as a right has altered
views about whether each abortion is some kind of killing. We have redefined death to suit our need for transplantable organs by adopting a braindeath standard. We are beginning to contemplate using higher-brain death.
In the midst of such disruptions of our understanding of death, the state may
be particularly concerned to preserve the core understanding that killing is
not just wrong, but unimaginable.
This taboo is not aimed just at attitudes toward killing oneself and others. It is directed particularly at a group with extraordinary power that resists
regulation-doctors. Thus Kass and Lund invoke "a centuries-old taboo
against medical killing, a taboo understood by many to be one of the cornerstones of the medical ethic." 140 They explain,
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Medical students, interns, and residents are taught-and acquire-a
profound repugnance to medical killing, as a major defense against
committing-or even contemplating-the worst action to which their
arrogance and/or their weaknesses might lead them. At the same time,
they are taught not always to oppose death .... But in order to be able
to keep their balance, physicians have insisted on the absolute distinction between deliberate killing and letting die. Non-medical laymen
(including lawyers and judges) may not be impressed with this distinction, but for practicing physicians it is morally crucial. 141
The state's interest in the taboo against killing, then, helps explain the
apparently arbitrary lines between killing and letting die of which the Ninth
and Second Circuits complained. Arbitrary they may in some ways be, but
they reflect and affirm social understandings on which crucial taboos rest.
The state's "symbolic and aspirational" interest in human life has a second element. The principal problem with suicide is not that a few dying people have trouble committing it, but that many people-particularly young
people-commit it who have not made a wise, or even competent, decision.142 Criminal prohibitions of suicide are so futile they have long since
been abandoned, and thus the state's challenge is again to promote a social
environment that deters suicide. Dignifying suicide by medicalizing it and
calling it a constitutional right seems likely to corrupt that environment.
I would even make-if cautiously-a third argument-that the state has
an interest in helping patients respond well to the shock and horror of mortal illness. When people encounter any new and daunting situation, they
rarely wish to work out from first principles how to cope with it. Rather, they
often wish to consult common practice. As Alan Wolfe writes, "When people
make decisions, they tend to look not to a mathematical formula to determine what is to their best advantage, but to what others do, to what they
have traditionally done, or to what they think others think they ought to
do. "143 The sick particularly need this social assistance in making decisions,
not just because their situation is often so unfamiliar, but because it is so
frightening. Thus one student of the memoirs people write about illness observes, "Perhaps one reason why the work of dying seems so difficult today is
that the individual is expected not only to face his or her death-in itself a
task arduous enough-but also create a way of dying out of the fragments of
ideologies and religious sentiments that our culture provides us." 144 This
does not tell us, of course, which social practices might most comfort and
sustain the dying. But I think the state may decide that in general they will
benefit most from practices that do not make suicide a standard resort,
which encourage the dying to maintain their ties with the living and to seek
the rewards life has yet to give them. 145
Here I do not think the Ninth Circuit is helpful. The right it announced
was rooted in the view that dependence must be deplorable and undignified.
The court, for instance, says "a terminally ill adult who ends his life in the
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final stages of an incurable and painful degenerative disease" might do so
partly "to avoid ... a humiliating death." 146 But why must such a death be
humiliating? As Callahan acutely says, "What Reinhardt has done, in effect,
is to bless a trivial, even demeaning, notion of dignity. What could be more
mischievous than a view of dignity that requires we be clean, alert, and able
to take care of ourselves?" 147
The Ninth Circuit might have argued that all three of these state interests are illegitimate because in promoting them the state makes itself directly interested in people's preferences. However, the state is not seeking to
override those preferences, only to shape them, or even to shape the forces
that shape them. Some of these preferences-like not wanting to kill-the
state is not just entitled but is even obliged to shape. But the state may legitimately shape the forces that influence other preferences. We will always be
shaped by our environments. We maximize our autonomy by shaping the
environments that shape us. But many of those environments-including
the hospitals in which American deaths today occur-are virtually impervious to us unless we use that one great tool, government. Seen in this way,
government is not just a threat to autonomy, but a device we recruit to protect ourselves from other threats to our autonomy. For example, Karnisar
asks, "In a climate in which suicide is the 'rational' thing to do, or at least a
'reasonable' option, will it become the unreasonable thing not to do? The
noble thing to do?" 148 And David Velleman suggests that the dying might
sometimes prefer not to have the choice to commit suicide so that they
might escape any sense of duty to do so. 149 Since a truly neutral environment
seems impossible, citizens may (within important limits) properly employ
the state's power to protect themselves from unfavorable environments.
The "collective" state interests extend beyond the expressive function.
For example, instituting a right to assisted suicide might well reduce the
presently strong incentive to create better ways to help the sick and dying.
Consider the hospice movement. It has helped transform palliative care and
provide decent and dedicated care for dying patients who have decided to
abandon their struggle for a cure. But as Kass and Lund fear, "Because the
quick-fix of suicide is easy and cheap, it will in many cases replace the use of
hospice and other humanly-engaged forms of palliative care, for there will be
much less economic incentive to continue building and supporting social
and institutional arrangements for giving humane care to the dying." 150
Hendin believes this has already happened in Holland, where "the easy solution of euthanasia or assisted suicide has led to a third kind of slippage: a
diminution in the quality of and pressure for palliative care, which became
one of the first casualties of euthanasia. Hospice care has indeed been virtually non-existent in the Netherlands." 151
Had it thought about what I am calling the state's collective interests,
the Ninth Circuit would no doubt have objected to them. It would have said
that it is hard for courts to evaluate them because taboos do their work indirectly, because preferences are shaped in labyrinthine ways, because social
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institutions are born of many forces. No doubt. But these are reasons courts
should judge collective interests perceptively and shrewdly, not reject them
out of hand. Such state interests matter, and a jurisprudence too crude to
respect them is poorly suited for making bioethical policy.
Assessing the State's Interests
In Compassion in Dying, Washington asserted a number of interests, none
of which struck the Ninth Circuit as weighty. I have suggested that the court
was hostile to the state's account of its interests for two reasons: because of
the structure of Fourteenth Amendment analysis, which typically scants
state interests, and because the court was ill-informed about the bases for
the state's claim. I suspect the Fourteenth Amendment tradition of dismissing state interests helps account for the court's abrupt treatment of many of
Washington's asserted interests, particularly what I have called collective interests. And in Compassion in Dying that abrupt treatment was particularly
easy because the court was so poorly informed. The list of its misperceptions
is long. The court did not seem to understand: the doctrine of double effect
and how doctors and patients regard it; the inescapable imprecision of "terminally ill"; the extent to which depression motivates the suicide even of
terminally ill people; the difficulty of diagnosing depression; how doctors and
patients interact; how patients make decisions; why terminally ill people
want to commit suicide; how the disadvantaged make choices at the end of
life; the effects of changes in American health care on decisions to die; the
difficulty of writing effective regulations in this area; the modest capacity of
doctors to prevent unwise decisions to commit suicide; the Dutch experience; or the probable effects of assisted suicide on doctors.
My point has not been that the state's interests require it to prohibit assisted suicide, for I do not believe they do. Nor is my primary point that the
state's interests justify the state's statute, although I believe they do. What I
have argued, rather, is that the Ninth Circuit seems to understand the
state's interests so poorly and to dismiss them so facilely as to cast doubt on
the court's capacity to make good public policy at least for this bioethical
issue.

Making Policy by Weighing Rights and Interests
Once the individual rights and the state interests at stake in a case have been
surveyed, standard Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence calls for the
court to judge whether the latter are strong enough to justify the statute's infringement of the former. This is surely a necessary step in making wise policy. But it is not one a court is well equipped to take.
The problems begin at the theoretical level. First, the Supreme Court
has been unable to specify what standard to use in evaluating competing
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rights and interests. 152 Its failure is disconcerting but understandable, since
the personal right and the state interest are incommensurable. This awkwardness might be avoided if a court only needed to decide if the right and
the interests had each attained some specified standard, and this is what the
Court for some time tried to require. Its system, however, proved too rigid,
and the Court's categories proliferated and now seem to have collapsed. The
Ninth Circuit's response to this defeat was to try to "balance" the right and
the interests. But this simply returned it to the core problem of incommensurability-that there is no scale on which rights and interests can be
weighed. And this revived the old problem of substantive due process-that
it requires judges to make so many poorly guided choices that it invites them
to read their own policy preferences into constitutional law.
Far from acknowledging these problems, the Ninth Circuit said proudly,
Weighing and then balancing a constitutionally-protected interest
against the state's countervailing interests, while bearing in mind the
various consequences of the decision, is quintessentially a judicial role.
Despite all of the efforts of generations of courts to categorize and objectify, to create multi-part tests and identify weights to be attached to
the various factors, in the end balancing entails the exercise of judicial
judgment rather than the application of scientific or mathematical formulae. No legislative body can perform the task for us. Nor can any
computer. In the end, ... we must rely on our judgment, guided by
the facts and the law as we perceive them. 153
This passage seems wrong-headed at every turn. First, far from being
"quintessentially a judicial role," weighing and balancing constitutional
rights against the state's interests is at the beginning a task the legislature
can and should undertake every time its acts implicate a constitutional
right. 154 Second, the judicial failure to "categorize and objectify" critically
erodes the court's authority to override the legislature's balance. One condition for granting power to unelected courts is that they must explain the
source of their authority and the logic of their decision. Third, the court
seems to concede at the end of this passage that it is essentially relying on its
own "judgment." It never explains what makes its judgment worthier of respect than the legislature's or even why its judgment might yield good policy.
On the contrary, the court unnervingly intimates that it can rely first and
primarily on its own judgment and only need have that judgment guided by
"the facts and the law as we perceive them."
But even a court less insouciant than the Ninth Circuit would face disabling problems balancing rights and interests in a case like Compassion in
Dying. Consider what it would take to develop a genuinely informed policy
about assisted suicide. Historically, courts have been content to announce
an individual interest of some specified weight and ask if the state has a
countervailing interest of some specified strength. But in making policy,
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other questions are relevant. First, how many people would want to exercise
the right? This matters, since good policy asks what a statute's total benefit
and total harm are.
The Ninth Circuit has no idea how many people would actually assert
the right. Perhaps swayed by the plaintiffs' stories, the court insistently says
"many." 155 But it never tells us what "many" means or how accurate it is.
The court needs to answer these questions because "many" may well be
wrong. A good estimate should start with everyone who is terminally ill and
mentally competent. From this group must be subtracted all those-clearly
the huge majority-who do not want to commit suicide. 156 From the remaining patients must be subtracted all those who can die by refusing medical treatment. Then one must subtract those who have been unduly pressured into committing suicide or who have improvidently decided to do so. 157
Then should be subtracted those who could achieve their goals by a means
other than suicide-for example, by entering a hospice or securing proper
pain medication. From those (few?) who are left must be subtracted those
who could commit suicide satisfactorily without help, for what is at issue is
not the right to commit suicide (which is nowhere criminal) but the right to
help in doing so. As Campbell writes, "Patients already have access to information about how to end their lives, and 'stockpiling' of medications has in
many instances given them access to the means to end life. "158 And perhaps
one should also subtract those who will have assistance whatever the law
says, for "press reports and polls suggest that some physicians already respond to their patients' requests for help by prescribing medication or providing a lethal injection." 159 Finally, one must subtract those patients for
whom even physician-assisted suicide would not provide the deliverance
they sought. 160 Perhaps this leaves "many" candidates, but a good policy
maker would at least be on notice to inquire in some serious way.
So the first thing we would need to know in weighing the costs and benefits of making assisted suicide a right is how many people would want to exercise it. Second, we would want to know how much worse off these people
would be were they denied suicide instead of being relegated to their next
choice. This is another inquiry the court seems quite uninterested in, even
though it is quite possible that the marginal benefits of assisted suicide
would turn out to be quite low. Third, we would want to know what collateral
benefits suicides might bring (to families relieved of the burden of caring,
paying, and sorrowing for their ill; to society saved the costs of medical care;
to dying people in general, who might find comfort in knowing they could escape their travail).
Such calculations would begin to give us a sense of the benefits of a
right to assisted suicide. We would also, of course, calculate the benefits of
prohibiting it. We would ask first how many people would make a nondefective decision to commit suicide, would be deterred by a statute prohibiting it,
and would be glad they had been deterred. Second, we would ask how many
people would make a defective decision to commit suicide. Third, we would
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ask how many friends or family members would benefit should a suicide be
prevented.
The preceding paragraphs suggest how complex the court's task would
be even if it simply tried to specify the numbers of people who might be injured or helped by a regime of assisted suicide. These are not inquiries at
which courts are likely to excel or even attempt. Courts specialize in determining what happened in some past event, not in trying to predict who
might be affected by a reform that has not even been instituted. Yet even if
the court could make these predictions, it would still need some way of assigning a weight to each kind of benefit and burden. And this is without even
considering the perplexities of measuring what I have called the state's collective interests, its interests in attitudes and institutions. In short, as Justice
Brandeis wrote,
Merely to acquire the knowledge essential as a basis for the exercise
of this multitude of judgments would be a formidable task; and each
of the thousands of these judgments would call for some measure of
prophecy. Even more serious are the obstacles to success inherent in
the demands which execution of the project would make upon human
intelligence and upon the character of men. Man is weak and his judgment is at best fallible. 161
The standard response substantive-due-process jurisprudence makes to
these onerous inquiries is to accord precedence to the individual rights at
stake. As I once explained:
Ordinarily, we talk in terms of what I have called the Mill paradigm:
"That is, we think in terms of the state's regulation of a person's actions. In such conflicts, we are predisposed to favor the person, out of
respect for his moral autonomy and human dignity. "162 That predisposition also rests on our assumption that the state can bear any risks of
an incorrect decision better than the individual can. 163
Such is the Ninth Circuit's approach: "The consequences of rejecting the
as-applied challenge would be disastrous for the terminally ill, while the adverse consequences for the state would be of a far lesser order." 164 However,
the Mill paradigm works only where the contest is between an individual's
rights and the interests of the state. That is not this case. Rather, this is a
contest between some individuals who want to commit suicide and other individuals who have an interest in being protected from making a defective
and incompetent decision to commit suicide. These interests conflict. We
cannot favor the individual against the state, because some individuals will
be harmed whatever we do. The Mill paradigm leads us to worry more about
limiting individual rights than injuring the state's interests because the state
can take its lumps better than individuals. But here individuals will suffer ei-
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ther way, and their autonomy interests will be injured either way. In other
words, part of the problem is that the court's categories-individual rights
and state interests-obscure the social realities it confronts.
The Ninth Circuit boasts that "balancing" individual rights and the
state's interests is "quintessentially a judicial task." In this section, I have suggested that the court's faith in its skill seems to rest on its underestimate of
the challenges of that task. The court does not seem to appreciate how many
identifiable groups stand to lose or gain from a regime of assisted
suicide, how hard it is to predict the number of members of each group, how
tricky it is to evaluate their interests (in health, in life, in happiness), how perplexing it is to assign weights to the state's collective interests, and
how impossible it therefore is to balance all the interests involved. To be sure,
these problems will harass any institution that must evaluate assisted suicide.
But what makes the court think itself so excellently suited to handle them?

The Culture of the Case

I have suggested that their training, experience, and resources poorly equip
judges for making bioethical policy, and I have tried to show how truncated
the analysis in even the court's lengthy opinion in Compassion in Dying was.
I now want to examine these problems from a different angle. American
judges and lawyers live in what we may call the culture of the case. That culture makes the case the focal point of law. That view grows out of our common law system (in which law is made by judges in cases) and out of the
American legal faith that even statutes and the Constitution find their meaning only when interpreted by courts in cases. American legal education too
reflects the culture of the case, for we teach law primarily through books that
compile cases. Cases are thus central to American law, and the culture of
the case shapes the way courts think and act. It does so in ways that may perhaps promote the efficient settlement of disputes but that impede making
wise policy. This is largely because a system developed to resolve disputes between two individuals or enterprises ordinarily promotes neither the attitudes nor the practices that conduce to making good social policy.
First, the culture of the case leads judges to believe they need historical,
not social facts. "Historical facts are the events that have transpired between
the parties to a lawsuit. Social facts are the recurrent patterns of behavior on
which policy must be based." 165 Courts tend to believe that social facts may
be inferred from historical facts, that the litigants before them represent the
facts needed to make policy. This is rarely true in cases of social importance.
Anyone might become terminally ill, and the circumstances of the dying differ enormously, but lawyers will present to the court only a few litigants
whose vivid but unrepresentative stories are virtually intended to mislead
the court about the social problem. 166 People who might be injured by a right
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to assisted suicide, on the other hand, are likely to be invisible to the court.
This is partly because they are hard to identify individually, especially in advance. As Arras writes, "The victims oflegalization, ... will be largely hidden
from view: they will include the clinically depressed eighty-year-old man
who could have lived for another year of good quality [and] ... the fifty-yearold woman who asks for death because doctors in her financially stretched
health maintenance organization cannot or will not effectively treat her unrelenting but mysterious pelvic pain .... "167 Furthermore, the state appears
before the court only in the drab person of a government attorney, not as a
suffering individual. Thus the court never puts a human face on those who
might be rescued from suicide or who might wrongly be led into it. Yet in my
experience judges often grow impatient with Brandeis briefs that try to provide systematic information about social facts. As an eminent jurist once said
to me when I suggested there might be systematic information on a legal
problem: "I know other people live differently from the way I do, and I'm not
interested." One result is the superficial treatment of social facts I catalogued earlier in the third section of this chapter.
The second feature of the culture of the case is that it draws judges toward what I call "hyper-rationalism." Hyper-rationalism may be both
methodological and substantive. As a method, it "is essentially the substitution ofreason for information and analysis. It has two components: first, the
belief that reason can reliably be used to infer facts where evidence is unavailable or incomplete, and second, the practice of interpreting facts
through a [narrow] set ofartificial analytic categories." 168 Hyper-rationalism,
in other words, tempts us to believe we can understand how people think
and act merely by reasoning, without investigating.
Methodological hyper-rationalism, then, offers a rationale for a way of understanding and writing about social problems. Substantive hyper-rationalism
furnishes the assumptions about how people think and act that stand in for
the information that might be garnered from empirical work. In bioethics, as
in many other areas of human thought, these assumptions tend to see people as operating in remarkably rational ways. They hold that people deliberate explicitly about their situations, that they do so in predominantly rational
terms, that they are autonomy maximizers, and that they have well-workedout agendas that they need autonomy to implement. These assumptions see
people primarily as makers of decisions reaching out for control over their
lives. Finally, while these assumptions do not entirely abstract people from
their social contexts, they tend to simplify those contexts deplorably .169
Courts succumb to hyper-rationalism because they share the common
belief that things are generally what they seem and because the alternative
is a daunting empirical inquiry_l7° Hyper-rationalism is a shortcut that permits judges to cope with their workload. In addition, hyper-rationalism permits courts that have become committed to a result to reach it without having to explain away awkward evidence. It is hard to say which of these

198 · Law at the End of Life

motives most influenced the Ninth Circuit, but it is easy to point to examples
of its hyper-rationalism. For example, the court wrote airily,
We believe that most, if not all, doctors would not assist a terminally ill
patient to hasten his death as long as there were any reasonable
chance of alleviating the patient's suffering or enabling him to live
under tolerable conditions. We also believe that physicians would not
assist a patient to end his life if there were any significant doubt about
the patient's true wishes. To do so would be contrary to the physicians'
fundamental training, their conservative nature, and the ethics of their
profession. 171
This passage purports to describe how doctors behave. It does so not by proffering evidence, but rather by positing that doctors have a nature that predictably governs their behavior. Just as boldly, the court assumes that doctors do what they are trained to do and what their professional ethics
command. This requires us to believe that the court correctly describes doctors' training, nature, and ethics and-improbably-that doctors will not be
subject to forces (like cost-conscious HMOs, or overwork, or importunate
patients, laziness, or a bad temper) that lead them to ignore their training,
nature, and ethics. The court hardly tries to substantiate its assumptions,
and I have argued that many of them are unlikely.
As it has developed, the culture of the case has a third defect. American
lawyers tend to see each case as standing for one primary idea. They commonly ask what the holding in a case is, or what its principle is. This is significant for two reasons. First, it implies that sound results can be reached
purely through the analysis of principles. Second, it suggests that the core
problems of a case can usually be solved by a single principle. 172 The Ninth
Circuit, for example, essentially thought that Compassion in Dying could be
decided by adumbrating the principle of autonomy. Often, however, good
policy arises not out of applying a single principle, but by reconciling many
conflicting principles. And often the problem is not to derive principles but
to understand complex empirical realities.
This leads us to the fourth problem the culture of the case presents in
constitutional litigation: it leads to piecemeal resolution of issues that are
closely related and that should be resolved together with an eye to the costs
and benefits of each choice. As Michael McCann puts it, "judicial authorities
are largely bound to episodic case-by-case remedies for complex social problems at odds with the long-term supervisory capacities necessary for effective means-oriented planning." 173 Both the Ninth and Second Circuits centrally argued that since the state permitted people to die by refusing
treatment, it must also permit assisted suicide. These courts seemed to feel
that if the risks of one were tolerable, so must be the risks of the other. 174
However, good policy would consider the cumulative effects of practices, not
the effects of each practice separately. Presumably we must tolerate some
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improvident decisions to die, but eventually their sum may begin to seem too
great.
The culture of the case is problematic in a fifth, related, way. Because
courts consider problems one case at a time, they slide easily down slippery
slopes. Courts too readily ask what the right result in this case is without investigating where the new precedent might lead. Anticipating the future is a
problem for all policy makers. But it is particularly a problem for courts,
which are commanded to decide only actual cases and controversies. The
problem becomes insuperable where courts, like the Ninth Circuit, refuse
even to consider what might lie ahead.
The culture of the case has other effects. Not least, it leads courts to ignore questions not framed by the doctrine under which suit was brought and
answers that are not doctrinally available. A court, for instance, is unlikely to
say that the best response to the desperation of the dying is to improve palliative care, for no constitutional doctrine points in that direction or gives
courts good tools for effectuating such a judgment. Furthermore, the culture
of the case tempts courts to twist problems into forms for which judicial
remedies are available. For example, it might for several reasons be desirable
to legalize assisted suicide but not to make it a right. However, the only way
the Ninth Circuit could legalize assisted suicide was by making it a right, and
that was what it tried to do.

Some Institutional Considerations
In the preceding sections, I have argued that courts are poorly equipped to
analyze the issues bioethical policy presents. In this section, I contend that a
number of institutional considerations make it desirable that courts not become the arbiters of that policy. These considerations speak not just to judicial disadvantages but to the advantages of other governmental and nongovernmental agencies.
First, a clarification. Where the Constitution commands courts to enforce rights, courts must surely do so. There are many areas in which the
Constitution is uncontroversially understood to issue just such commands
(even if the substance of each decision may be controversial). However, as I
argued earlier, assisted suicide is not such a case. And where there is some
reason to think affected people have been excluded from democratic institutions, even rights skeptics may want courts to be specially alert for violations of the Fourteenth Amendment. But here there are no "discrete and insular minorities." There is no reason to think some group or some point of
view has been barred from the ballot box or the legislature's hall's. On the
contrary, everyone risks being in the position of the plaintiffs in Compassion
in Dying, or their families, or their friends. 175
But even if courts are not constitutionally commanded to act, do they
not at least have institutional advantages? Perhaps so, but probably fewer
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than courts assume. In choosing an institution to make bioethical policy in
general and assisted-suicide policy in particular, one criterion should be an
institution's flexibility and its ability to promote-or at least tolerate-social
experimentation. Experimentation is desirable for two reasons. First, assisted suicide is terra incognita. Much will depend on our ability to regulate
it. Ifwe can regulate it well, many of the objections to it will evaporate. However, failures ofregulation are likely to reveal themselves only slowly. For example, we are worried about the extent to which routinization will dull the
regulatory ardor of physicians, and routine develops gradually. We are worried about slippery slopes, but we slide down them gradually and unwittingly.
Not only will pathologies grow slowly, but they will be hard to detect and to
measure. All this means we must be free to reverse our course whenever serious problems become evident.
The second reason we should value flexibility is that medicine at the
end of life is a dynamic area in which change is constant and in which law
must change with change. For example, progress in pain management or
treating depression would vitiate the rights claim by weakening the argument that only suicide could offer the patient relief from misery. On the
other hand, better techniques for diagnosing depression might calm our
worries that the clinically depressed were being inadvertently helped to die.
Similarly relevant are the seismic shifts in the structure and financing of
American medical care. Even apparently fundamental professional attitudes
may change. For instance, it used to be a commonplace that doctors were
too eager to keep patients alive, that they were so determined to keep metabolism going, so enthusiastic about technology, and so loath to fail that
they would prolong life even at the cost of kindness. Today, doctors' attitudes
have altered strikingly, and the visitor to the ICU will often see doctors counseling patients and families to begin to consider withdrawing treatment. 176
If flexibility is our goal, constitutional adjudication should not be our
tool. For one thing, constitutional rights inhibit the experimentation our federal system is supposed to promote. Justice Brandeis's statement of the point
is not just familiar, it is right: "It is one of the happy incidents of the federal
system that a single courageous state may, if its citizens choose, serve as a
laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to
the rest of the country." 177 Were the Court to make assisted suicide a constitutional right, all the country would have to permit it, and permit it in the
specific forms the Court felt were consonant with the right.
Worse, once courts announce a constitutional opinion, they commonly
resist changing it. And not without good reason. Stare decisis is crucial to a
system of case law. Yet courts dislike reconsiderations for less admirable reasons as well. Judges, like the rest ofus, resist admitting error. Once we have
made up our minds, we usually have a framework of interpretation into
which we fit new evidence. With that framework, we can be wonderfully ingenious in interpreting new data to prove that we were right in the first
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place. As Bacon put it: "The human understanding, once it has adopted
opinions, either because they were already accepted and believed, or because it likes them, draws everything else to support and agree with them.
And though it may meet a greater number and weight of contrary instances,
it will, with great and harmful prejudice, ignore or condemn or exclude them
by introducing some distinction, in order that the authority of those earlier
assumptions may remain intact and unharmed." 178 Hence the natural conservatism of the decision maker.
What is more, courts, with their contempt power, readily-and to some
extent properly-regard resistance as an affront to judicial dignity and to justice itself. Once a court announces not just an order, but a constitutional
right, disagreement looks even more like a perfidy that must be met firmly
and even sternly. As a matter of judicial psychology, the judge who has announced "the law of the land" tends to become perturbed and then insistent
when states persist in resisting. When thwarted, courts tend to ask "How
can these people disobey a lawful order of our court?" instead of "Why are
people not doing what we expected and wanted?"
This leads to my next point. I have catalogued ways courts are badly
equipped to make bioethical policy. But do not judges bring special virtues to
their work? Perhaps, but those virtues have their own vices and are too often
absent. One of these virtues is that courts-unlike legislatures-must justify
their conclusions in principled terms. And so they should. But in Compassion
in Dying those principled terms often seem ill considered. And Kamisar, a
cautious and careful scholar even if a zealous partisan, strikingly invokes the
words of Louis Henkin to describe even the Supreme Court's work: '"Some of
the Court's unacceptable lines just happen. To avoid difficult questions, to
support a result dictated by intuition or sympathy, perhaps to achieve a majority for that result, the Justices seize a rationale that comes to mind, without asking where it leads and whether they are prepared to go there."' 179
But I would also argue that sometimes a purely principled resolution is
not the best one. Where people deeply disagree over basic principles (as they
do about many matters ofbioethical policy), there is much to be said for delaying any kind of final decision until there has been a thorough social examination of the issue and the reasons for disagreement about it. 180 And
even where such a process has been carried on as long as is fruitful, compromise may be morally legitimate and practically desirable. Where reasonable and decent people vehemently disagree, it is hard to say who is right.
And the political and social cost of unresolved disagreement is likely to be
painfully high, as Roe's sequelae attest. 181 So a compromise of the conflicting principles may be necessary. Unfortunately, courts often cannot find a
legal basis for such a compromise, predict which compromise might work, or
commit the antagonists to accepting it.
Assisted suicide seems an attractive case for compromise. Many and
perplexing are the moral and practical issues it presents. Good-hearted and
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thoughtful are the adversaries. Indeed, we may already be moving toward
compromises. One developing pattern is to make assisted suicide a crime but
not prosecute it. And Kamisar argues that we have already achieved another
kind of compromise, since "the line between letting die and actively intervening to bring about death represents a cultural and pragmatic compromise
between the desire to let seriously ill people carry out their wishes to end it
all and the felt need to protect the weak and the vulnerable." 182
Detachment and dispassion are also said to be virtues judges have and
others lack. 183 Of course, commitment and passion may be good responses
to hard problems. But even when detachment and dispassion are desirable,
judges too often spurn them. The Ninth Circuit has much to regret on this
score, for its opinion is written in strangely extravagant language. For example, the court lauds itself as a barrier to "arbitrary and intrusive" exercises of
state power. 184 Perhaps Washington's statute is unwise. Perhaps it is unconstitutional. But it is not arbitrary. It is a kind of statute many states-indeed,
many countries-have long had that plausibly attempts to abate undoubted
evils. The Ninth Circuit contends the statute balances the competing interests unwisely, but it hardly attempts to show the statute is arbitrary. (And it
is odd to call a statute that prohibits a doctor from delivering fatal drugs to a
patient intrusive.)
Perhaps we should not repine at such immoderation. But what is surely
dismaying is the court's harsh and vituperative spirit. The court characterizes arguments with which it disagrees-even when they are the arguments
of other judges-as "disingenuous," "fallacious," "meretricious," "ludicrous," "nihilistic," "inflammatory," and "disastrous." Yet the court is also
sanctimonious, self-serving, and self-satisfied. After slurring those impertinent enough to believe the Washington statute is constitutional and jeering
at their opinions and arguments, the court piously concludes by saying,
Given the nature of the judicial process and the complexity of the task
of determining the rights and interests comprehended by the Constitution, good faith disagreements within the judiciary should not surprise
or disturb anyone who follows the development of the law. For these
reasons, we express our hope that whatever debate may accompany
the future exploration of the issues we have touched on today will be
conducted in an objective, rational, and constructive manner that will
increase, not diminish, respect for the Constitution. 185
Judicial care and caution are missing not just from the language but the
substance of Compassion in Dying, as many commentators have noted.
Arras says that "[w]ithin the blink of an eye, a seemingly unmovable consensus within the medical profession, the judiciary, the bioethics community,
and the general public was unceremoniously overturned." 186 Burt writes
that "the rulings by the Second and Ninth Circuit overturning state laws explicitly forbidding physician-assisted suicide were not merely novel exercises
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of constitutional authority. These rulings startlingly impose a legal result
that was without precedent in any prior state or federal legislative action." 187
Kamisar concludes that those two cases "shattered a general consensus that
withholding or withdrawing life-saving treatment constitutes neither suicide
nor assisted suicide nor homicide .... '[T]he moral significance of the distinction has been subjected to periodic philosophical challenge,' but the distinction 'has remained a basic tenet of health care law and mainstream medical ethics."' 188 The Supreme Court itself said, "To hold for respondents [as
the Ninth Circuit had done], we would have to reverse centuries oflegal doctrine and practice, and strike down the considered policy choice of almost
every State." 189
I have argued that constitutional adjudication is a poor way of making
bioethical policy. Is there a better way? I believe so. I would certainly not
argue that any human institution will reliably produce admirable results,
and I would certainly agree that no other branch of government can meet all
the high standards for making policy against which I have measured courts.
But the alternative to constitutional adjudication is not any single institution.
Rather, it is the whole set of governmental and nongovernmental organizations that influence policy where they have not been preempted by constitutional adjudication.
The debate over assisted suicide has been conducted in many venues.
The issue has perhaps been discussed most profoundly in the private conversations the dying, their doctors, and their families have had. 190 Doctors
have pondered it in private conversations and professional meetings, and
their professional groups have developed formal opinions about it. Suicide
and euthanasia have for years been a staple of debates among bioethicists.
Many kinds of private associations, from religious groups to organizations
like Compassion in Dying, have become involved. Journalists have covered
these activities and many more, and newspaper stories, television reports,
magazine articles, and books continue to proliferate. Left to their own devices; these unofficial conversations are likely to contribute to a set of unofficial social practices not inevitably inferior to judicial edict.
Legal institutions of various kinds have likewise been active. Commissions to investigate assisted suicide-notably the New York Task Forcehave been appointed and have written thoughtful reports. Legislative hearings and debates have been conducted. 191 Criminal trials and appeals have
been held. Five referenda in four states have been placed before the voters.
In all these ways the processes of democracy have been vigorously and usefully at work.
Nor is assisted suicide the only bioethical topic democratic and private
institutions have handled actively without the benefit of constitutional adjudication. The President's Bioethics Commission drafted a three-volume report that had wide influence, and many state commissions performed similar services. The definition of death was expanded to include brain death in
a quiet but effective process in which professional groups presented care-
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fully considered proposals to legislatures to be enacted into law. The legal
doctrine of informed consent developed through common law adjudication.
Doctors' attitudes toward withdrawing medical treatment have been considerably moderated through purely private, hardly noticed means. Courts deciding end-of-life cases have even moved away from the constitutional reasoning the court used in Quinlan in favor of reasoning based on statutes and
the common law.
Each of these institutions has advantages as a bioethical policy maker.
Together they have many. Most of these institutions have a flexibility courts
interpreting the Constitution cannot have, for they are generally not bound
by their previous decisions nor by a particular method. Many of them bring
expertise to the issue. Commissions are primarily composed of people who
are already expert or who become so during their work, and they employ expert staffs. Professional associations are composed of and employ experts.
Even legislatures usually can find within their ranks a few specialists and
can hire knowledgeable staffs and recruit expert witnesses.
These institutions can also control the timing of their decisions; they
can act when the moment is propitious. Courts, on the other hand, must
generally act when litigants arrive. For example, one can imagine the
Supreme Court reaching a different result in Glucksberg had it arisen after
several years of a successful experiment in Oregon with assisted suicide.
Many institutions can address issues much more broadly than courts. This is
partly because some of them command or influence resources that can be
used in many ways. A legislature, for example, can allocate funds for many
kinds of programs; courts are essentially confined to a few due process remedies.
Not least, these institutions represent, can speak directly to, or can bind
the disputants in a way courts cannot. Thus these institutions are better
placed to shape a discussion that leads to effective resolutions of disputes.
Some of these institutions have been admirably creative in trying to do so.
For example, the Michigan legislature passed a statute criminalizing assisted
suicide but provided that the statute would have effect only until a commission with broad representation had examined the problem.
In sum, courts have a number of institutional disadvantages in making
bioethical policy. Constitutional adjudication tends to inhibit the flexibility
policy needs in a dynamic area both by setting a standard states cannot escape and by cementing judges in decisions they have reached. The judicial
virtues of principled reasoning, detachment, and dispassion-even when
they are useful virtues-are not always practiced assiduously, and certainly
were not in Compassion in Dying. No single institution does possess all the
virtues a good policy maker needs. But the other branches of government,
along with the many interested private organizations, are better placed to
consider issues expertly and thoroughly, to act at the right moment, to reach
compromises, to develop complex answers to complex problems, and to respond flexibly to the continuing course of change.
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Conclusion
I have argued that constitutional adjudication is a poor way to make bioethical policy. My reasons have been several. First, little in the training or experience of judges prepares them to make good public policy in most areas,
including this one. Second, little in the text or even the history of the Fourteenth Amendment helps judges make good bioethical policy. Nor has the
Court been able to develop doctrine that has a convincing rationale or that
seems to help it formulate wise policy. Such a doctrine would require that
the Court be able to explain the principles it was consulting, would specify
the limits on those principles, would state workable tests to employ in applying them, and would use those tests reasonably and predictably. Such a doctrine remains elusive.
Third, constitutional litigation is a poor way to gather the social facts
necessary for making good public policy, and many judges even doubt they
need them. This has meant courts have not demonstrated that they understand the issues assisted suicide raises. For example, the Ninth Circuit
seems not to have grasped how doctors and ethicists have understood the
doctrine of double effect nor the consequences of rejecting that doctrine. It
seems not to know where the problem in defining "terminally ill" lies nor
how hard it is to do so. It appears not to have understood how common depression is among the suicidal, how often it goes undiagnosed, or how treatable it is. It seems to have a naive view of human motivation generally, of the
motives of the ill particularly, and yet more particularly, of the motives of the
suicidal. It seems not to realize why people worry about the disadvantaged in
a world where assisted suicide is a constitutional right. It does not seem to
perceive the ways new economic concerns and new organizational structures create new incentives to hasten the dying along their way. It seems
oddly optimistic about how well doctors might regulate the process of suicide. The court seems ignorant of the contemporary ethos of medicine, of
the way medical decisions are made, of how doctors deal with patients, of the
reasons for the origins of bioethics, and of the regulatory problems Holland
has yet to solve. Nor does much in the court's information prepare it to
speculate intelligently about how a new regime will work out in practice.
What is more, judicial formulas systematically underweight the state's
interests. Some of those interests, as I just said, courts seem not to understand. Less concrete but still important factors-the state's "collective" interests-courts abruptly dismiss. And courts are not equipped to evaluate
the cumulative costs of the rights it and other institutions create. Furthermore, the Court has found no principled way to gauge the heft of the individual's right or the state interests so as to weigh the two against each other.
On the contrary, the balance is unduly weighed in favor of the individual's
rights by the judicial tendency to apply the Mill paradigm, to treat every contest as one between the individual and the state rather than as a conflict
among individuals with divergent interests.
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In the end, it should not be surprising that courts are so limited as an
agency of public policy. They are the institution ultimately responsible for allocating power among the branches of the federal government and the
states; defining free speech; structuring religious liberty; setting the boundaries of criminal procedure; deciding when regulations exceed the government's power to take property without compensation; specifying the minimal procedural rights governmental agencies must accord clients; writing
some of the basic rules for resolving problems ofrace; interpreting every federal statute; and much, much more. Responsible for so much, courts can
understand only a little. The government of courts must be the government
of amateurs.
In sum, the institutions of democracy-public, semipublic, and private-have been working together to shape our policies toward assisted suicide. They are reaching plausible conclusions. Together, they are placed to
make better bioethical policy than a court acting as the interpreter of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Together they are actually writing better policy
than the federal courts when they have tried to write it. (The Supreme
Court's success was to decline the invitation.) These institutions have yet
another advantage. They are the voice of democracy. That voice is not pure;
it is not unflawed; it is not infallible. But assisted suicide is an issue that can
affect anyone, that everyone can speak to. In fact, it is an issue as to which
an exceptionally large proportion of the population has an opinion. 192 We
value democratic government partly because it allows the people affected by
a decision to help make it. When courts take decisions away from democratic institutions, courts should be able to advance convincing reasons and
to assure us that their job will be done well. I have argued that courts can
offer no such assurances when they take bioethical policy into their own
hands.
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